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Avi-Yonah:

Back From the Dead:
How to Revive Transfer Pricing Enforcement
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1
Transfer pricing enforcement is dead
Edward Kleinbard (2007)
In the six years since the then Chief of Staff of the JCT pronounced transfer
pricing enforcement to be dead, numerous case studies have demonstrated
the truth of his observation, starting with the JCTs own examination of six US
based multinationals (MNEs) in 2010 and followed by the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations hearings on Microsoft, HP and Apple in 201213. There is little doubt that the current transfer pricing rules, in conjunction
with the dysfunctional Subpart F rules, allow US-based MNEs to shift most of
their profits to low tax jurisdictions. It is estimated that there are currently
about 2 trillion dollars of such profits that benefit from deferral and cannot be
repatriated because they are not subject to foreign tax and therefore would be
subject to full US taxation upon repatriation under current law. Hence the push
to adopt territoriality and allow the MNEs to distribute these trapped profits as
dividends to their US parent, which can then in turn use them to pay dividends
to its shareholders.
The OECD has recently come to recognize that the transfer pricing system
does not work as intended. In its report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,
the OECD recognizes that BEPS results in revenue losses that affect all
states, especially poorer ones; that systematic tax avoidance by the richest
and most powerful companies in the world undermines the general legitimacy
of taxation; that it gives MNEs significant competitive advantages over purely
domestic firms, resulting in inefficient allocations of investment and major
distortions to economic activity; and that it skews the decisions of the MNEs
themselves, resulting in overall economic welfare losses.
This article will contrast three approaches to dealing with the BEPS problem:
adopting a unitary taxation regime; ending deferral; and adopting anti base
erosion measures. It concludes that while the first approach is the best long
term option, the other two are more promising as immediate candidates for
adoption in the context of US tax reform and the OECD BEPS project.
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1. Unitary Taxation
Unitary taxation (UT) involves treating each MNES as a single unit,
disregarding the formal distinctions among its constituent corporations, and
allocating its profits to the various taxing jurisdictions by formula. This is the
approach adopted by the US states and the Canadian provinces, and that is
being considered for adoption by the EU as a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base, or CCCTB.
In principle, UT has two major advantages over the current system. First, it is
a better fit for the way a modern MNE operates, since most MNEs are
integrated units with no attention being paid to the formal distinctions among
parent and subsidiaries except for tax and limiting liability purposes. Second,
UT applies the same regime to all MNEs and does not rely on the increasingly
unimportant question of where the parent corporation is resident.
But UT faces formidable obstacles to being adopted. First, it confronts
considerable opposition from the OECD, which remains formally committed to
the separate accounting method and the arms length standard (ALS). The
OECD interprets its model treaty as forbidding the application of UT to parent
subsidiary combinations, and has recently reinterpreted the model to apply
similar rules to branches as well, including situations where a subsidiary can
be deemed to be a dependent agent Permanent establishment (PE) of its
parent. Second, in the absence of agreement on the allocation formula UT
runs the risk of creating more double taxation. Third, a formula that relies on
factors such as the location of assets or payroll risks driving MNEs to shift
jobs to low tax jurisdictions.
I believe that in principle these objections can be overcome. I have argued
elsewhere that the OECD interpretation of the treaties is not persuasive and
that many treaties contain language that permits the application of formulas to
subsidiaries that are considered dependent agent PEs of their parent, as long
as the result is consistent with the arms length standard, which in the absence
of comparables will be impossible to disprove. The double taxation risk is to
some extent under the control of the MNEs, and is not more problematic than
the reality of double non-taxation and the risk of double taxation under the
current regime. The disagreement over the formula and the threat to jobs can
be alleviated if the formula relies only on the destination of sales, since the
costumer base is less subject to tax competition and states generally like to
tax imports and exempt exports.

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/85

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2363580

2

Avi-Yonah:

Nevertheless, I think that in the immediate context of US tax reform and the
BEPS project, UT is a bridge too far: there are too many technical details that
need to be worked out for it to become a viable solution in the next couple of
years. The best that can be hoped for is for the OECD to realize that the
allocation of the residual profit under the profit split method, which is its
preferred method for dealing with income from intangibles and other forms of
income that are hard to source under the ALS, should be done under a
formula and not left to each country to deal with as it pleases (the US
allocates it to where R and D takes place, which favors its revenue interests
but is irrelevant to the location of profits). Such a formulary approach to
dealing with the residual would address the bulk of the problem while not
violating the ALS, since the OECD agrees that in the absence of comparables
any allocation of the residual is compatible with the ALS.
In the longer term, I do hope that even the OECD will be persuaded to move
toward UT. If the EU adopts the CCCTB, this will give us a good working
example in the context of high tax jurisdictions. Thus, I will continue to work on
UT solutions, because these are the best outcome for a world in which
integrated MNEs do not really belong to any jurisdiction. But this is a long term
project.
2. Abolishing deferral.
It has also been realized for a long time that abolishing deferral deals
effectively with the outbound transfer pricing problem for US based MNEs. In
fact, Subpart F was enacted with the understanding that it will deal with the
transfer pricing problem by subjecting all income that was likely to escape
high foreign taxes to immediate US tax. The problem is that the world has
changed in two ways since then: First, it is now possible to earn active income
in many jurisdictions without foreign tax because of tax competition, and
second, Subpart F has been undermined by the check the box regulations
and the subsequent adoption of 954(c)(6).
The usual arguments against abolishing deferral are that it will put US
multinationals at a competitive disadvantage, that it will lead to inefficient
outcomes because less efficient foreign MNEs will obtain projects that should
have been owned by more efficient US MNEs, and that it will lead to migration
of US MNEs to other countries and to the establishment of new MNEs in other
jurisdictions with more favorable tax rules.
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All of these arguments assume that abolishing deferral can only be done
unilaterally. But the OECD BEPS project action plan envisages strengthening
CFC rules, and I believe this presents the US with a golden opportunity to
abolish or significantly restrict deferral while pushing other OECD members
and large developing countries to follow the same route. As discussed below,
option Y of Sen. Baucus’ recent proposal is the best vehicle for achieving this
goal.
If all the large jurisdictions in the OECD and G20 agree to severely curtail their
deferral or exemption systems, this addresses all the arguments raised
against doing so unilaterally. There will be no competitive disadvantage or
inefficiency since the competition will be subject to the same rules, and it will
not be possible to move to another jurisdiction since the likely headquarters
jurisdictions will also follow the same rules.2
3. Base Erosion.
Abolishing deferral does nothing to address inbound transfer pricing abuse.
Thus, I believe that it should be coupled with significant anti base erosion
limitations. As suggested by Lowell and Wells, these should include an overall
limit on deductible payments to related foreign parties, including cost of goods
sold, interest and royalties. Such limits can be taken in conjunction with
abolishing deferral and together these two steps will go a long way toward
eliminating transfer pricing abuse.
4. The Baucus Proposal.
On the face of it, Sen. Baucus’ proposal would seem to go in the opposite
direction of what I suggest should be done, because it adopts territoriality as
its base line. The main concern with territoriality is that it will encourage MNEs
to shift even more profits overseas because they will no longer face
constraints against bringing them back onshore. The proposal to tax the
accumulated 2 trillion that are currently offshore at a lower rate of 20% would
likewise seem to reward profit shifting.

Strengthening the exit tax provisions of IRC 7874 by imposing a deemed sale
of all assets upon expatriation via merger and adopting a managed and
controlled test for corporate residence would help prevent tax induced moves
of corporate headquarters.
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But Sen. Baucus’ proposal also includes anti-shifting rules that go a long way
toward mitigating these concerns. These come in two varieties dubbed
options Y and Z. Under both options, income of CFCs from sales of goods
and services into the US will be subject to immediate US tax. Income from
foreign sales would under option Y be taxed at 80% of the US rate with a
credit for foreign taxes. Under option Z, such income would be subject to full
US tax unless it is connected with an active foreign business operation, in
which case it will be subject to tax at 60% of the US rate with credit for foreign
taxes.
I believe that the US sale rule is an important innovation because it means
that we tax the CFC based on the ultimate destination of the sale of its goods
or services regardless of whether it has a PE in the US and regardless of
whether the sale is done through an unrelated conduit. This can be an
important precedent for the kind of Unitary Taxation discussed above in which
at least the residual profits of all corporations (not just CFCs) are taxed in the
country they are sold into.
Of the two options, I strongly prefer option Y because it does not distinguish
between types of foreign income and because the differential between the US
rate and the rate applicable to foreign income is much smaller. Option Z relies
on an antiquated distinction between active and passive income of MNEs that
is very difficult to police in practice, as borne out by the experience of other
countries that have similar rules. Moreover, this distinction has nothing to do
with competitiveness, which is determined by the overall tax burden of the
MNE.
If option Y is adopted, it will go a long way toward abolishing deferral. Assume
that the US tax rate is 30%. Under option Y this will put the US tax rate on
foreign income at 24%, which is about the OECD average. While there will still
be a difference between US and foreign operations, the shifting potential
would be significantly reduced.
If option Y is adopted by the US, the likelihood that the OECD would be willing
to follow suit is quite high. The empirical data show that EU MNEs already
bear an effective tax rate on their overall profits that is higher than 24% and
higher than that borne by US based MNEs. Thus, other OECD countries that
are currently under pressure to reduce the effective tax rates of their MNEs
because of competition from the US but that also need the added revenue
more than the US will be able to use the Baucus proposal as a reason to cut
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back on their exemption systems and apply their tax rates, which are also
about 24% on average, to the entire operation of their MNEs.
The history of international taxation is replete with examples in which
unilateral moves by the US led other countries to adopt similar rules. The
foreign tax credit, CFC rules, the transfer pricing methods, the branch profit
tax and most recently FATCA were all American innovations copied by other
countries. Unfortunately, the same is true for the portfolio interest exemption
and the check the box rules, which led to a race to the bottom. It is time for the
US to resume its natural position as leader in a race to the top.
5. Conclusion
The best way to kill transfer pricing abuse now is to adopt option Y of the
Baucus proposal in conjunction with anti base erosion rules aimed at
protecting the US tax base from foreign MNEs. If US based MNEs are to be
taxed in full on their sales into the US, there is no reason not to apply the
same rules to foreign based MNEs selling into the US. This can be done by
adopting the anti base erosion rule and by using sales destination as the basis
for allocating the residual under the profit split method.
In the longer run, I believe we should erase the distinction between US and
foreign based MNEs by subjecting both to UT with formulary apportionment,
which should in principle lead to a purely territorial system with no Subpart F
or foreign tax credit needed. But we are not there yet, and in the immediate
future curtailing deferral and base erosion are the best ways or the US to push
the BEPS project forward.

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/85

6

